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CASE NOTES
Environmental Regulation/Constitutional Law-"TAKING"
JURISPRUDENCE AND ITS APPLICATION TO REGULATIONS OF SENSITIVE
ECOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTs-Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc.,
399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
Estuary Properties, Inc. (Estuary) owned approximately 6,500
acres of land in Lee County, consisting mostly of coastal wetlands.1
On June 18, 1975, Estuary applied to the Board of County Com-
missioners of Lee County for approval of a development of regional
impact (DRI).2 Estuary's plan, ultimately calling for the construc-
tion of 26,500 residential units,8 would require destruction of 1,800
acres of predominantly black mangroves. In place of the man-
groves, Estuary proposed to build an "interceptor waterway,"
which would be used to raise the elevation of the remaining land
for construction.'
The development proposal was submitted to the Southwest Flor-
1. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374, 1376 (Fla. 1981). The supreme
court described the land as "a sensitive ecological environment." Id.
2. Id. Pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 380.06(1) (1979), "development of regional impact means
any development which, because of its character, magnitude, or location, would have a sub-
stantial effect upon the health, safety, or welfare of citizens of more than one county."
"Developments of regional impact" is but one provision of the Florida Environmental
Land and Water Management Act of 1972. The other is related to "areas of critical state
concern." FLA. STAT. § 380.05 (1979). For a discussion of the process for designation of areas
as "of critical state concern," see Note, Florida's Adherence to the Doctrine of Nondelega-
tion of Legislative Power, 7 FLA. ST. U.L. REy. 541, 549-51 (1979).
3. 399 So. 2d at 1376. The plan, involving an estimated eventual population of 73,500,
would constitute eleven commercial centers, four marinas, five boat basins, three golf
courses, and twenty-eight acres of tennis facilities. Id.
4. Id. Mangrove is a common name for certain shrubs and trees that grow in dense
thickets or forests along tidal estuaries and characteristically have exposed, supporting
roots. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, MICROPAEDIA VI, at 565 (1974). In tropical estuaries,
the vegetation sequence is dominated by mangrove trees, whose densely interwo-
ven systems of stems and roots rapidly build up a swampy shore. With time, the
substrate may build up above the reach of the tide, and the mangrove swamp may
give way to oak, mahogany, and other hardwood trees. One of the greatest man-
grove swamps in the world exists in southwestern Florida where the brackish estu-
arine water forms ideal environmental conditions. Although the estuaries may lose
area, valuable land is often built up by mangrove growth. In the last 40 years in
Biscayne and Florida Bay regions, some 1,500 acres of new land have formed as a
direct result of mangrove growth.
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, MACROPAEDIA VI, at 970 (1974).
Estuary maintained that the proposed waterway would ameliorate the potential harm
from the mangrove destruction, since it "would replace the functions of the black mangroves
in the ecosystem." 399 So. 2d at 1376.
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ida Regional Planning Council, which recommended that Estuary's
application for development approval be denied.5 After public
hearings,8 the Board of County Commissioners adopted the Coun-
cil's findings and concluded that "the proposed development would
cause the degradation of the waters of Estero and San Carlos
Bays. ' '7
Estuary appealed the order to the Florida LaiWl and Water Ad-
judicatory Commission. 8 After a de novo hearing, a hearing officer
found that the record supported the findings that destruction of
the black mangroves would have an adverse impact on the environ-
ment and the natural resources of the region.9 The Adjudicatory
Commission adopted the hearing officer's recommended order de-
nying Estuary's application for development. 0 Estuary then
sought judicial review."'
The First District Court of Appeal reversed the findings of the
Adjudicatory Commission and Lee County, concluding that "denial
of the requested development permit cannot be sustained absent
payment of full compensation to petitioner for the taking of the
mangrove acreage lying below the salina.' 2 The court, reasoning
from a posture of constitutionally protected rights, held that:
5. The Council prepared a report pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8) (1973). 399 So. 2d
at 1376.
6. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(7) (1979) requires that public hearings be held after due notice
prior to a decision regarding development.
7. 399 So. 2d at 1376. The regional planning agency, in preparing its report and recom-
mendations, must evaluate the extent to which the proposed development will affect (1) the
environment and natural resources of the region, (2) the economy of the region, (3) the
water, sewer, solid waste disposal or other necessary public facilities, (4) the public trans-
portation facilities, (5) the ability of the public to find adequate housing accessible to their
places of employment, (6) the energy consumption, and (7) other criteria deemed appropri-
ate by the regional planning agency. FLA. STAT. § 380.06(8) (1979). The criterion concerning
the effect of the proposed development upon the energy consumption was not applicable to
Estuary's application for a permit. See 399 So. 2d at 1376 n.1, 1378 n.6.
8. The Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission is composed of the Governor
and the Cabinet. See FLA. STAT. §§ 14.202, 380.07(1) (1979). For a discussion of an appeal of
a local order to the Adjudicatory Commission, see Comment, Burden of Proof in Land Use
Regulation: A Unified Approach and Application to Florida, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. Rzv. 499, 516
(1980).
9. 399 So. 2d at 1377. The hearing officer also concluded that the interceptor waterway
would not adequately replace the functions of the mangroves. Id.
10. Id. at 1377 n.4.
11. Review of the Adjudicatory Commission's order may be sought by petition to the
district court of appeal. See Comment, supra note 8, at 516.
12. Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1140 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1979), af 'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc., 399 So.
2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
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[W]hile government clearly has the right to expropriate private
property for purposes beneficial to the general public, it cannot
require a single property owner to bear the cost of such general
benefits. This principle, which is the essence of the "property
clauses" of the United States and Florida Constitutions, com-
mands that the cost of public benefits be borne by the public. ' s
Specifically rejecting a "balancing" test"' and utilizing instead a
"diminution in value" test,1 5 the court found that the "[pletitioner
has been denied the right to use its property because that use
would deny the public certain free benefits."" In addition, the
court found that the hearing officer, Lee County, and the Adjudi-
catory Commission erred "[in failing to balance the numerous fac-
tors involved' 7 and in assigning to Estuary the burden of proving
that the development plan would not result in ecological change
and pollution of the adjacent bay."8
The Florida Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice
McDonald, differed with the First District Court of Appeal on two
grounds. First, the supreme court held that "the district court in-
correctly reversed the adjudicatory commission's finding that the
proposed DRI would have an adverse impact on the region."' 9 The
13. 381 So.2d at 1138.
14. The court confidently asserted:
This principle [that the costs of benefits flowing to the public at large must prop-
erly be borne by the public] is universally accepted in more traditional contexts of
governmental taking and is, in fact, the essence of constitutional property rights.
The true constitutional issue in this case is whether there has been a taking of
Petitioner's property rights, not whether the public benefits of preserving man-
grove wetlands outweigh the private injury to Petitioner.
Id. at 1139. See notes 134-39 infra and accompanying text.
15. "This 'diminution in value' test has been since interpreted by other courts to mean
that although government can regulate the use of private property for the public benefit, it
cannot preclude the owner from all economically practicable uses." 381 So. 2d at 1138. See
notes 127-33 infra and accompanying text.
16. 381 So. 2d at 1138.
17. Id. at 1137. The factors that the court is speaking of are located in FLA. STAT. §
380.06(8) (1979). See note 7 supra.
18. 381 So. 2d at 1135. The court relied upon Zabel v. Pinellas County Water and Navi-
gation Control Auth., 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965). For a thorough criticism of the court's
reliance on Zabel, see Comment, supra note 8, at 513-14.
19. 399 So. 2d at 1379.
Justice Adkins provided the sole dissent:
I would grant rehearing and approve the opinion and decision of the district
court. I also believe the dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan of the United
States Supreme Court in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego -
U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1287, 67 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1981), controls our decision on in this
case.
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court distinguished Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation
Control Authority"0 stating that "[o]nce there is sufficient evidence
of an adverse impact, it is neither unconstitutional nor unreasona-
ble to require the developer to prove that the proposed curative
measures will be adequate."' 1 The court, however, found that the
Adjudicatory Commission, as a state agency, 22 procedurally failed
to indicate requisite changes,'8 such that "Estuary could ascertain
what it would be required to do to obtain approval.""s4 As a result,
the case was remanded to the district court.'5
Second, the supreme court disagreed with the district court's
conclusion that the facts constituted a "taking.'2 Citing Goldblatt
v. Town of Hempstead,' the court found that Estuary's permit
was initially denied because the proposed development would
399 So. 2d at 1383 (Adkins, J., dissenting). For a discussion of San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
v. City of San Diego, see notes 112-21 infra and accompanying text.
20. 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965). The court initially distinguished Zabel from the instant
case factually-. "In Zabel the property in question had been transferred from the state to the
landowners by a conveyance which carried with it a statutory right to bulkhead and fill the
property purchased," 399 So. 2d at 1379, whereas "[w]hen Estuary bought the property in
question in this case . . .it did so with no reason to believe that the conveyance carried
with it a guarantee from the state that dredging and filling the property would be permit-
ted." Id. (footnote omitted). Significantly, the court then compared the initial findings in
Zabel with those in the instant case: "In Zabel the Court did not find that any material,
adverse effect on the public interest had been demonstrated," id., whereas "[i]n the instant
case there is no question but that the proposed development would have an adverse envi-
ronmental impact." Id. See generally Comment, supra note 8, at 513-14.
21. 399 So. 2d at 1379. The supreme court reasoned that inasmuch as no specific weights
are placed on the statutory criteria, a hearing officer could have permissibly determined that
certain criteria outweighed others. At the heart of the court's reasoning is the principle that
"[blalancing in an adjudicatory process does not always mean that four favorable considera-
tions outweigh two unfavorable considerations." Id. at 1378. See note 7 supra.
22. Relying upon FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1) (1977), the court found the Adjudicatory Com-
mission, as "exercising administrative powers," a state agency. 399 So. 2d at 1380.
23. According to FLA. STAT. § 380.08(3) (1973), if a government agency denies a permit
for development, it shall specify its reasons in writing and indicate any changes in the pro-
posal that would make it eligible.
Appellants, in this case, argued that inasmuch as the commission adopted the recom-
mended order issued by the hearing officer, which did not contain any specified changes, the
order of the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council is reinstated. 399 So. 2d at 1380.
But, as the court indicated, "[ilf this were true . ..the commission's order should have
expressly so indicated." Id.
24. 399 So. 2d at 1380 (quoting Estuary Properties, Inc. v. Askew, 381 So. 2d 1126, 1132
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Graham v. Estuary
Properties, Inc., 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981)).
25. 399 So. 2d at 1380. Specifically, the court ordered the district court to remand it to
the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission with instructions that FLA. STAT. §
380.08(3) (1973) be followed. 399 So. 2d at 1383.
26. 399 So. 2d at 1380, 1381.
27. 369 U.S. 590 (1962). See notes 83-88 infra and accompanying text.
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cause a public harm, not because a public benefit would result
from the denial.28 Furthermore, quoting from Just v. Marinette
County,29 the court seemed to embrace a concern for a policy of
environmental sensitivity: "[A]n owner of land has no absolute and
unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his
land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its
natural state and which injures the rights of others."30
The court's analysis of the taking issue, however, is weak in sev-
eral respects. First, although the court seemed to distinguish Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,81 it failed to address its application to
the "diminution in value" test.5 ' Second, despite the recognition of
Chapter 380 of the Florida Statutes as involving "a balancing of
the interests of the state in protecting the health, safety, and wel-
fare of the public against the constitutionally protected private
property interests of the landowner,"38 the court failed to address
whether such a balancing test pertains in determining whether a
taking has occurred." Third, the court failed to mention the "nui-
sance" feature in its harm/benefit analysis;3 5 the district court even
referred to this factor, indicating that the administrative process
had found that destruction of the mangroves would have a damag-
ing effect.5 6 Finally, the court confused an analysis of what consti-
28. 399 So. 2d at 1382. The court attempted to get around the problems involved in a
public benefit extraction/public harm prevention analysis of the taking issue by stating.
[T]he line between the prevention of a public harm and the creation of a public
benefit is not often clear. it is a necessary result that the public benefits whenever
a harm is prevented. However, it does not necessarily follow that the public is safe
from harm when a benefit is created.
Id. See notes 140-42 infra and accompanying text.
29. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
30. 399 So. 2d at 1382 (quoting Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis.
1972)).
31. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See notes 52-67 infra and accompanying text.
32. Compare 399 So. 2d at 1380, 1381 with 381 So. 2d at 1138. Interestingly, the su-
preme court acknowledges "[tihe degree to which there is a dimunition in value of the prop-
erty" as a factor in determining whether a regulation is a valid exercise of the police power
or a taking. 399 So. 2d at 1380.
33. 399 So. 2d at 1377.
34. Compare id. with 381 So. 2d at 1139. See note 14 supra.
35. See Finnell, Coastal Land Management in Florida, 1980 Am. B. FOUNDATION RE-
SEARCH J. 307, 392-93; notes 142-46 infra and accompanying text.
36. The district court stated that:
[T]he hearing officer did find that the finding of the Board of County Commis-
sioners of Lee County and the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council that
destruction of the black mangroves would have an adverse impact on the environ-
ment and natural resources of the region was supported by the record ... . The
hearing officer concluded that removing the black mangroves would greatly in-
crease the risk to the surrounding bays of pollution; that pollution in the bays
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tutes a legitimate exercise of the police power with an analysis of
what constitutes public benefit or harm. The court started with
two propositions. One was that "[i]f the regulation creates a public
benefit it is more likely an exercise of eminent domain, whereas if
a public harm is prevented it is more likely an exercise of the po-
lice power.13 7 The other was that "[p]rotection of environmentally
sensitive areas and pollution prevention are legitimate concerns
within the police power. ' ' " From these propositions, the court con-
cluded that "the regulation at issue here promotes the welfare of
the public, prevents a public harm, and has not been arbitrarily
applied." e From a logical point of view, however, the argument
commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent.40 It is only when
the court provided the following "public harm/nuisance" factor
that the conclusion logically follows: "In this case, the permit was
denied because of the determination that the proposed develop-
ment would pollute the surrounding bays, i.e., cause a public
harm."4 1
The United States Constitution provides that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation." '42
Similarly, the Florida Constitution provides that "[n]o private
property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with full
compensation."' " Florida's Environmental and Water Management
Act of 1972 recognizes the possible constitutional implications in-
herent in environmental regulations and cautions that the Act does
not authorize any agency to act in any way that is "unduly restric-
tive or constitutes a taking of property without the payment of full
would have an adverse impact on the economy of the area (the bays provide fish
and other economically related marine life); that requiring the landowner to re-
frain from such degradation of state owned waters was both a reasonable restric-
tion on the use of his land and a requirement of Chapter 380; and that because
the interceptor waterway was not shown to be capable of assimilating the nutri-
ents entering it, its use would not prevent the degradation of the bay waters.
381 So. 2d at 1131-32.
37. 399 So. 2d at 1381 (citation omitted).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See M. BEAmsLEY, THINKING STRIGHT 41 (4th ed. 1975). A general rule of inference
is modus ponens, where given two propositions, a third logically follows: (i) If X then Y and
(ii) X, therefore (iii) Y. See generally H. KAHANz, LOGIC AND PHrLosoPHy 43 (2d ed. 1973).
41. 399 So. 2d at 1382.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (No state shall "deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
43. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 6. See also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 ("No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.").
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compensation."" The Act, however, fails to articulate the point at
which governmental action becomes so restrictive or so complete as
to become a taking which requires payment of compensation.40
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that the supreme
court's constitutional analysis of taking in Estuary Properties was
inadequate from a legal and policy point of view. After tracing the
United States Supreme Court's development of the "taking" con-
cept, this note will evaluate the analytical paradigms utilized by
the United States and Florida Supreme Courts. Discussion will
show that taking, in an environmental context, requires a broad
analytical model encompassing ethical and social norms.
The landmark case in taking jurisprudence is Mugler v. Kan-
sas,46 where the Supreme Court, in 1887, upheld the shutting
down, without compensation, of a brewery under the Kansas prohi-
bition law. The Court closely examined the character of the physi-
cal invasion as a means of distinguishing an exercise of the police
power from eminent domain.47 The Court's binary distinction be-
tween these two powers served the ends of clarity and simplicity: if
the government appropriated or physically invaded the land it was
eminent domain; otherwise it was an exercise of the police power.48
Finding that (a) there had been no appropriation of the property'9
and (b) the owner's right to utilize the land for lawful purposes
remained undisturbed,50 the Court dismissed the owner's claim,
reasoning that the state should not provide restitution for losses
resulting from restrictions placed on the noxious use of land."1
Thirty-five years later, the Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,62 moved away from a Mugler-like determina-
tion of the nature of the government's action as either eminent do-
44. FLA. STAT. § 380.08(1) (1979).
45. See generally Harris, Environmental Regulations, Zoning, and Withheld Municipal
Services: Takings of Property by Multi-Government Action, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 635 (1973);
Haigler, McInerny, Rhodes, The Legislature's Role in the Taking Issue, 4 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 1 (1976).
46. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
47. Id. at 666-69.
48. See generally F. BosSELumA, D. CALLYS, J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 105-23 (1973).
Justice Harlan, holding himself out as a strong proponent of the physical invasion re-
quirement, see notes 122-26 infra and accompanying text, carefully distinguished Pumpelly
v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871), on the ground that, unlike Mugler, it in-
volved a 'permanent flooding of private property,' a 'physical invasion of the real estate of
the private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession.'" 123 U.S. at 668.
49. 123 U.S. at 669.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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main or an exercise of the police power. Instead, the Court found
the taking issue to be a "matter of degree" and consequently one
which "cannot be disposed of by general propositions."5 In
Mahon, a homeowner sought an injunction against underground
coal mining pursuant to a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting mining
of subsurface coal in populated areas." Although the Supreme
Court recognized that the enforcement of the law would "destroy
previously existing rights of property and contract,"' the Court
did not hold the statute unconstitutional as violating due process
of law.66 Rather, the Court held that the mining restriction was
tantamount to a taking: "[Wihile property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking. 5
7
Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, 8 juxtaposed the con-
cepts of police power and eminent domain on a continuum, by
stating that the difference between the two powers is one of degree:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident
to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law. As long recognized, some values
are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its
limits, or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact
for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the
diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not
in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act.59
53. Id. at 416.
54. For a discussion of the purpose of the Pennsylvania Act, see F. BoSsELMAN, D.
CALLI.S & J. BANTA, supra note 48, at 126-30.
55. 260 U.S. at 413. A deed executed prior to the statute's enactment by the home-
owner's predecessor in title had granted the coal company the right to engage in such min-
ing. Id. at 412.
56. Professor Tribe notes its significance:
Eminent domain in Mahon thus became a kind of procedural substitute for sub-
stantive guarantees of contractual autonomy; rather than invalidating statutes in
which the public character of the benefit was unclear while the private harm was
both evident and focused, the Court in effect forced the public to internalize
private costs in ambiguous cases by requiring government to compensate private
parties for what they were being forced to lose.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-5, at 445 (1978) (footnote omitted).
57. 260 U.S. at 415.
58. Mr. Justice Brandeis filed the single dissenting opinion. Id. at 416 See notes 64-66
infra and accompanying text.
59. 260 U.S. at 413.
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The Court, while focusing on the extent to which the restrictions
impaired the value of the property rights, established a test which
inquires whether the property can be put to any reasonable use:
"What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exer-
cised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine
certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional pur-
poses as appropriating or destroying it.''60
The Mahon Court seemed to utilize a balancing approach to de-
termine if the regulation goes too far, by weighing the public inter-
est against the magnitude of the harm to private property rights.
On one side of the scale, Justice Holmes noted that the public in-
terest in minimizing danger to the "single private house" involved
was limited, while "[o]n the other hand the extent of the taking
was great." 1 Applying the statute solely to the plaintiff's position,
then, a public interest was not displayed to justify "so extensive a
destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights."62
Justice Holmes went on, however, to discuss the general validity of
the act; that he did so suggests that, for purposes of a balancing
test, the harm involved should comprehend not merely the individ-
ual whose property was taken, but all potential plaintiffs. As one
commentator has noted, "[t]he unanswered question is whether
Justice Holmes meant to define the concept of 'reasonable use' by
balancing the harm inflicted on the property owner against the
public benefits flowing from the act or by measuring without re-
gard for the public benefits involved." 6
Justice Brandeis, dissenting, stated that a "restriction imposed
to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers
threatened is not a taking. The restrictiop here in question is
merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted
remains in the possession of its owner."" Suggesting that the
Court should have examined the value of the land as a whole,"
Justice Brandeis criticized the majority's position that justification
for the police power required a mutuality of advantage between
60. Id. at 414.
61. Id. at 413-14.
62. Id.
63. Harris, supra note 45, at 660 n.138.
64. 260 U.S. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
65. Justice Brandeis argued that aggregate property rights could be so partitioned as to
create a taking as a consequence of any regulation; furthermore, he stated that without
including the value of the entire parcel of land, it would be possible to conclude that the
sum of the divided interests could be greater than the whole. Id. at 419.
19811
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the public and the landowner. 66
Although the analysis in Mahon is critical to a discussion of tak-
ing jurisprudence, its precedential value is limited by the observa-
tion that when Mahon was decided, land use regulations were nas-
cent.67 It was not until four years later, in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co.," that the Supreme Court announced the valid-
ity of zoning.69 Furthermore, six years after Mahon, the Court
recognized that in certain circumstances, the economic welfare of
the community can outweigh and prevail over private economic
interests.
In Miller v. Schoene'7 0 the Court upheld a Virginia statute re-
quiring the destruction of all red cedar trees infected by cedar rust,
reasoning that if the disease spread to a nearby apple orchard, the
orchard's commercial value would have been completely destroyed.
The Supreme Court, in upholding the statute without requiring
compensation, pointed to the significance of the apple orchard to
the state economy and, accordingly, deferred to the legislative
judgment that protection of the apple orchards was of greater
value than the landowner's rights in the ornamental cedars.71
The Supreme Court in Miller, departed from Mahon in two fun-
damental respects. First, the Court suggested that redistribution of
private property may be justified in the public interest.7 2 Second,
the Court implied that the state has a positive role to play, a func-
tion whose exercise will benefit some individuals while at the same
time hurt others. 73
66. Id. at 422. Although Justice Brandeis conceded that this reciprocity may be essential
if the purpose of a regulation is to confer benefits upon the community, he asserted that
governmental constraints are not proper when furthering the public safety. Id. (citing,
among others, Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)).
67. See Haigler, McInerny, Rhodes, supra note 45, at 5.
68. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
69. In Euclid, the court declared that "[tihe harmless may sometimes be brought within
the regulation or prohibition in order to abate or destroy the harmful." Id. at 392 (citing
City of Aurora v. Burns, 319 Ill. 84 (1926)). The Court reasoned that the community, not the
judiciary, was in the best position to formulate a legislative remedy, absent an indication
that the ordinance was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unrelated to the public welfare. Id. at
395-97. See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (prohibiting municipality
from applying an otherwise constitutional zoning ordinance which was not shown to have
substantial relationship to the public interest).
70. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
71. Id. at 279. The court seemed to determine that no less drastic alternative was
available.
72. See L. TRiHE, supra note 56, § 8-5, at 445.
73. See id. As Professor Tribe pointed out, "the Court opined that, if the state had done
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The departure from Mahon grew from economic considerations
in Miller to aesthetic values in Berman v. Parker,7 4 where the Su-
preme Court, in 1954, extensively expanded the parameters of the
police power. Although the action involved a constitutional chal-
lenge to the exercise of eminent domain, the Court relied upon an
analysis of the police power to justify the acquisition of property
pursuant to the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1954.vs
The Court reasoned that inasmuch as the notion of public welfare
is broad and inclusive, the enhancement of the qualitative aspects
of life, in addition to the protection of the public, warrants justifi-
cation under the rubric of police power.7' As in Miller, the Berman
Court deferred to legislative determinations of public welfare:
"Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature
has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-
nigh conclusive. '7 7
Inasmuch as Berman was an eminent domain proceeding, the
Court was not asked to evaluate the economic consequences of an
application of the police power; the Court considered the rights of
the property owners as satisfied, since the element of just compen-
sation accompanied the eminent domain proceeding.7 8 In the
1960s, however, the Court had three opportunities to address the
magnitude of economic harm involved in police power actions.
In Armstrong v. United States,9 the Court faced the issue of
whether a compensable taking of property occurred where the gov-
nothing and permitted disaster to strike the apple orchards, 'it would have been none the
less a choice.'. .. [Tihe majority rejected the common law of nuisance as a baseline in favor
of a more generalized idea of the public interest." Id. at 445-46 (quoting from Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. at 279) (footnote omitted).
74. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
75. Pursuant to the Act, a public agency was formed and granted the power of eminent
domain to acquire all the property within large areas of the city found to contain high con-
centrations of slums and substandard housing. Once the area had been obtained, property
designated for public use was transferred to a governmental agency and the remainder of
the property was sold to a private redevelopment company for renovation and resale.
Two hypotheses have been offered as to why the court used the police power to justify an
exercise of eminent domain. One is that the Court inter-changed the concepts of "public
purpose" required for the police power and "public use" as specified in the fifth amend-
ment. The second is that the Court viewed eminent domain as a means of fulfilling the
broader public purpose under police power. See Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the
Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 1021, 1036-37 (1975).
76. 348 U.S. at 33.
77. Id. at 32.
78. Id. at 36.
79. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
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ernment had made certain materialmen's liens unenforceable by
asserting sovereign immunity.80 Finding that the government's ac-
tion constituted a taking of property without just compensation,
the Court stated:
Before the liens were destroyed, the lienholders admittedly had
compensable property. Immediately afterwards, they had none.
This was not because their property vanished into thin air. It was
because the Government for its own advantage destroyed the
value of the liens, something that the Government could do be-
cause its property was not subject to suit, but which no private
purchaser could have done.8"
Armstrong may be interpreted in one of two ways: (1) a Mahon-
like finding that the assertion of sovereign immunity made the
liens useless for any reasonable purpose, or (2) a Mugler-like deter-
mination that the government appropriated the property for its
own advantage in a proprietary capacity.82
Two years later, in Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,8s the Court
admitted that "[t]here is no set formula to determine where regu-
lation ends and taking begins. 8 4 Upholding a safety ordinance
which prohibited commercial use of property, the Court cited
Mugler for the proposition that a deprivation of the most benefi-
cial use of land is justified when existing uses are prejudicial to the
public interest.88 The Court, nevertheless, preserved the vitality of
80. The United States had contracted for the building of ships under an agreement pro-
viding that, in the event of default by the company, title to all completed and uncompleted
work would be transferred to the United States. Default occurred and several hulls passed
to the Government. Because the shipbuilder had not paid for all of his materials, petition-
ers-materialmen sought to enforce their state materialmen's liens against the United States.
See Harris, supra note 45, at 643 n.45.
81. 364 U.S. at 48.
82. See Harris, supra note 45, at 644.
The three dissenting Justices in Armstrong argued that no taking had occurred, since the
economic damage inflicted was a mere "consequential incidence" of a valid exercise of the
power of sovereign immunity. 364 U.S. at 49 (Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter and Clark,
JJ., dissenting). Furthermore, they argued that "[tihe very nature of the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity precludes regarding its interposition as a Fifth Amendment 'taking."' Id. at
50. For a discussion of the dissent's "consequential incidence" theory, see Harris, supra note
45, at 644 n.50.
83. 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
84. Id. at 594.
85. Id. at 593. In addition to Mugler, the Court cited the following cases: Walls v. Mid-
land Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915);
Reinmen v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915). See Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City and Cty. of
San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358 (1910).
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Mahon by indicating that "[t]his is not to say, however, that gov-
ernmental action in the form of regulation cannot be so onerous as
to constitute a taking which constitutionally requires compensa-
tion."' In blending Mugler and Mahon to preserve the possibility
that a regulation may require compensation if it prevents an owner
from making any reasonable economic use of his property, 7 the
Court enumerated flexible criteria for evaluating the validity of the
police power, including: (i) the scope of the public interest in rela-
tion to the interference with private property, (ii) the efficiency of
the means in light of the alternatives, (iii) the nature and extent of
the interference with private property, and (iv) the financial loss
resulting from the regulation. 8
Finally, five months after Goldblatt, the Court failed in an op-
portunity to clarify its ambiguity regarding the analytical Mugler-
Mahon hybrid. In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los
Angeles,89 the Court considered an appeal from a zoning case that
posed the question "whether zoning ordinances which altogether
destroy the worth of valuable land by prohibiting the only eco-
nomic use of which it is capable effects a taking of property with-
out compensation."' 0
The case arose when Los Angeles zoned the appellant's property
for agricultural and residential use, thereby prohibiting the re-
moval of rock, gravel, and sand from the land. 1 The California Su-
preme Court held that no right of compensation existed, reasoning
that the property could be used for other purposes." The United
States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substan-
tial federal question.'8 Inasmuch as the dismissal was technically
on the merits, it stands as good precedent."
In 1978, the Supreme Court continued its expansion of the ap-
86. 369 U.S. at 594.
87. See id. at 592; Harris, supra note 45, at 645.
88. 369 U.S. at 595. The Court, however, found that the absence of relevant evidence
precluded the application of these criteria. Id.
89. 20 Cal. Rptr. 638 (1962), appeal dismissed per curiam, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
90. Brief for Appellant, Jurisdictional Statement at 5.
91. See 20 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
92. Id. at 647.
93. 371 U.S. 36 (1962) (Justices Harlan and Douglas thought that probable jurisdiction
should have been noted).
94. See Harris, supra note 45, at 646 n.66 (citing H. HART AND H. WECHSLER, FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 574 (1953); Note, Supreme Court Per Curiam Practice: A
Critique, 69 HAnv. L. Rlv. 707, 712 (1956); Note, The Insubstantial Federal Question, 62
HARv. L. REv. 488, 494 (1949)). For a discussion of the use of Consolidated Rock Products
as precedent, see Harris, supra note 45, at 646 n.66.
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plication of police powers in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York. 95 While Berman v. Parker" incorporated aes-
thetic values into traditional notions of public welfare, the Penn
Central majority "sanctioned broadened uses of police power in
the governmental formulation of solutions (by recognizing) the
complex problems emanating from increasingly concentrated com-
munities and from concurrent pressure to enhance the quality of
citizens' lives.' 7
In Penn Central, Penn Central Transportation Company sought
to construct a multi-story office building above the Grand Central
Terminal. A Landmark Preservation Committee" disapproved of
the plans, ruling that the proposal was incompatible with the char-
acter and design of the terminal." Penn Central contended that
the landmark restrictions constituted a taking of its air rights in
violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitu-
tion.100 The New York Supreme Court ruled that the New York
City Landmark Preservation Law was unconstitutional as ap-
plied. 01 The Appellate Division disagreed, indicating that there
could be no taking without complete deprivation of all beneficial
use of the terminal.'02 The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, 03
reasoning that the transfer development rights'04 granted suffi-
ciently mitigated the regulation's adverse financial effects.' 0 '
The United States Supreme Court affirmed and held that New
York City's Landmark Preservation Law did not constitute an un-
constitutional taking.' 06 The Court found the exercise of eminent
95. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
96. See notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text.
97. Comment, You Don't Have to Take It or Leave It, 31 U. FLA. L. REv. 429, 440
(1979).
98. For a discussion of the New York City Landmark Preservation Law, see id. at 429,
n.4.
99. 438 U.S. at 117-18.
100. Brief for Appellants at 4.
101. Jurisdictional Statement app. at 71.
102. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20, 29 (1975) (citing
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States v. Central Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155 (1958)).
103. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 397 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977).
104. Transfer development rights provide a landowner with an opportunity to further
develop other property in lieu of lost development potential as a consequence of regulation.
See generally Marcus, Air Rights Transfers in New York City, 36 L. & CowrEmp. PROn. 372
(1971); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75
(1973); Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972).
105. 397 N.Y.S.2d at 921.
106. 438 U.S. at 138.
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domain as government acting in its proprietary role and utilizing
private resources pursuant to an enterprise function.1 07 Further-
more, the Court found that the use of police power is warranted
when government acts as a mediator among various social interests
and implements a program which adjusts benefits and burdens in
light of community goals. 10 8 In distinguishing Mahon from Penn
Central, the Court indicated that Mahon represented distinct in-
vestment-backed expectations, 1"9 while Penn Central's primary ex-
pectation was not impaired.110 In giving great weight to the trans-
fer development-rights as a form of compensation, the Court,
nevertheless, stated that when an adverse economic impact on a
private landowner outweighs the public benefits, deprivation of the
use of property may require compensation.'
The most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court concern-
ing the taking issue is San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego."" In this 1981 case, the appellant owned 412 acres within
the municipal limits of San Diego which was acquired in 1966 as a
possible site for a nuclear power plant. Approximately one-half of
the land fell within an estuary known as the Los Perasquitos La-
goon. Additionally, roughly one-third of the land was subject to
tidal action from the Pacific Ocean." 8
In 1973, the San Diego City Council rezoned parts of the prop-
erty from industrial to agricultural. That same year, the City of
San Diego established an open-space plan while the City Council
proposed a bond issue in order to obtain funds to acquire open-
space lands.1 4
As a result of these events, the appellant instituted an action
alleging that the City took its property without just compensation.
The landowner argued that it was deprived of the entire beneficial
107. Id. at 128 (discussing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
108. Id. at 124-25.
109. Id. at 130 n.27.
110. Id. at 137. The Court expressed the belief that neither the complete exploitation of
potential land development nor the most beneficial use of the land is protected under the
fifth amendment. Id. at 125-30.
111. Id. at 136 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that the record did not support the value of the
transfer rights as just compensation. He found the context of noxious uses, as found in
Mugler, to be determinative for evaluating whether the public's safety, health, and welfare
were greater than the private landowner's interest. 438 U.S. at 138 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
112. 101 S. Ct. 1287 (1981).
113. Id. at 1289.
114. Id. at 1290.
19811
504 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:489
use of the property. The City's response was that the appellant
had never sought its approval for any development plan. 115
After a complex procedural history,11 the Supreme Court dis-
missed the appeal because of the absence of a final judgment." '
The case is significant, though, inasmuch as it articulates a stance
of the majority of the Court, through Justice Brennan,118 with re-
spect to when "a government entity must pay just compensation
when a police power regulation has effected a "taking" of "private
property" for "public use" within the meaning of that constitu-
tional provision." 1 '9
Employing a Mahon-like balancing test,12 the minority declared
that a "taking" occurs where the effects of the governmental action
completely deprived the owner of his proprietary interest:
Police power regulations such as zoning ordinances and other
land-use restrictions can destroy the use and enjoyment of prop-
erty in order to promote the public good just as effectively as for-
mal condemnation or physical invasion of property. From the
property owner's point of view, it may matter little whether his
land is condemned or flooded, or whether it is restricted by regu-
lation to use in its natural state, if the effect in both cases is to
deprive him of all beneficial use of it. From the government's
point of view, the benefits flowing to the public from preservation
of open space through regulation may be equally great as from
creating a wildlife refuge through formal condemnation or in-
115. Id.
116. After a non-jury trial on the issue of liability, the court granted judgment for the
appellant. Id. at 1291. A subsequent jury trial on the issue of damages resulted in a $3
million judgment for the appellant. Id. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed.
Id. The California Supreme Court, in granting the city's petition for a hearing, automati-
cally vacated the appellate court's decision. Before the hearing, however, the supreme court
retransferred the case to the court of appeal for reconsideration. Id. When the case was
retransferred, the court of appeal reversed the judgment of the superior court. Id. at 1292.
The California Supreme Court denied further review. Id. at 1293.
117. Id. at 1293. Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion of the Court, and Justice
Rehnquist, concurring, relied upon 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1980). See 101 S. Ct. at 1294.
118. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell, reached the
merits of the case "[b]ecause the Court's conclusion fundamentally mischaracterizes the
holding and judgment of the Court of Appeal." 101 S. Ct. at 1296. Justice Rehnquist, pro-
viding the swing vote, stated:
If I were satisfied that this appeal was from a "final judgment or decree" of the
California Court of Appeal, as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, I would have
little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Brennan.
Id. at 1294.
119. Id. at 1301 (footnote omitted).
120. See notes 61-62 supra.
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creasing electricity production through a dam project that floods
private property.112
To summarize, the Supreme Court has utilized five analytical
paradigms to evaluate whether a situation is compensable for pur-
poses of constitutional law. The first determines whether the pub-
lic has physically used or occupied something belonging to the
claimant.12 In other words, a compensable taking occurs when
governmental action results in an encroachment upon a privately-
owned asset of economic worth.12 3 This "physical invasion" crite-
rion fails, however, on three levels: (i) inasmuch as "taking" con-
notes a physical appropriation, "the magic of physical invasion is
rooted in wordplay;"""s (ii) it does not explain those situations
where compensation for physical destruction is denied; 12 5 and (iii)
it does not recognize those situations where the regulation may be-
come so restrictive that the landowner is precluded from making
reasonable use of his property. 12 6
Given the limitations of the physical invasion analysis, a second
paradigm arises which focuses upon the amount or degree of harm
inflicted upon the claimant. 127 Pursuant to this "diminution in
value" test, a regulation which prevents the most beneficial use of
the claimant's property does not constitute a taking,1 28 while a reg-
ulation which prevents any reasonable use is a compensable tak-
121. 101 S. Ct. at 1304 (footnotes omitted). The minority amplified by indicating that
"[w]hen one person is asked to assume more than a fair share of the public burden, the
payment of just compensation operates to redistribute that economic cost from the individ-
ual to the public at large." Id. at 1306. Cf. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188
(5th Cir. 1981) (Justice Brennan's analysis applicable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit).
122. See generally Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethi-
cal Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 H~Av. L. REv. 1165, 1184-90 (1967). For a
discussion of the evolution and demise of the physical invasion concept, see Sax, Takings
and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 38-46 (1964).
123. See Harris, supra note 45, at 640 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887);
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871)).
124. See Michelman, supra note 122, at 1185; L. TRIE, supra note 56, § 9-3, at 459-60.
125. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133
(1894).
126. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For a list of Florida
cases which demonstrate this proposition, see Harris, supra note 45, at 640 n.31.
127. See generally L. TRIME, supra note 56, § 9-3, at 460; Harris, supra note 45, at 652-
58; Michelman, supra note 122, at 1190-93.
128. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Gold-
blatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dis-
missed per curiam, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
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ing.12 9 This test, however, is subject to two criticisms. First, the
element of "magnitude of the harm" is highly subjective.3 0 Fre-
quently, decisions which have been based upon "noxious" or "nui-
sance-like" uses of property are void of reasoning regarding "mag-
nitude of harm" considerations.131 Accordingly, this test is
generally applicable only to those situations which involve neither
a physical takeover nor "nuisance" restrictions.13 2 Second, there is
the problem of determining the dispositive factor: "Is the suppos-
edly critical factor the size of the private loss absolutely, or rather
the size of that loss compared with some other quantity?"3
The third paradigm evaluates whether the claimant's loss is out-
weighed by the public's gain, i.e., a balancing of the social gain and
the private detriment.13 ' As the Florida Supreme Court stated in
129. This analytical paradigm is well illustrated in Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Board of
County Commissioners, 349 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The court based its
conclusion that "the challenged resolution has [not] so restricted petitioner's use of his
property as to render it valueless," id. at 671 (emphasis added), on three premises: (i) "[a]
zoning ordinance is confiscatory if it deprives an owner of the beneficial use of his property
by precluding all uses to which the property might be put or the only use to which it is
reasonably adaptable," id. (citing Forde v. City of Miami Beach, 1 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1941);
County of Brevard v. Woodham, 223 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969)) (emphasis
added); (ii) "it is not necessary to the constitutional validity of an ordinance that it permit
the highest and best use of a particular piece of property," id. (citing City of Miami v.
Zorovich, 195 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967), cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 554 (Fla.
1967)) (emphasis added); and (iii) "government through the exercise of its police power may
impose reasonable restrictions upon the use of property in the interests of the public
health, morals, safety and public welfare," id. (citing City of Miami Beach v. Ocean and
Inland Co., 3 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 1941); Sarasota County v. Barg, 302 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1974))
(emphasis added).
130. Compare Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (upholding statute requiring de-
struction of all red cedar trees infected by cedar rust disease due to economic welfare of
community) with Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1957), modified, 101 So. 2d
371 (Fla. 1958) (compensation must be paid for lost profits by the owner whose healthy
trees were destroyed, where citrus trees were destroyed to contain a citrus disease).
131. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Consolidated Rock Prods.
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, appeal dismissed per curiam, 371 U.S. 36
(1962).
132. "Its main targets are regulations directed against 'innocent' property uses, and non-
trespassory devaluations consequent on public development." Michelman, supra note 122,
at 1191.
133. Id. at 1192.
134. If the private losses are found to be outweighed by the social gains, no compensa-
tion need be provided. See generally Harris, supra note 45, at 659-64; Michelman, supra
note 122, at 1193-96.
In direct contrast to the approach the Florida Supreme Court adopted in Estuary, Profes-
sor Binder indicated that "[tihe main problem with the balancing tests previously proposed
is that, aside from a simple statement of the principals to be considered in balancing, no
attempt is made to weigh and analyze the varying factors. Certain considerations are obvi-
ously more important than others and should bear more weight." Binder, Taking Versus
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1952: "The exercise of the police power, from its very nature,
clashes with full enjoyment of property by its owner, and it is only
because the welfare of the whole people so far outweighs the im-
portance of the individual that this interference with constitutional
guaranties can be justified." ' A balancing of social gains against
private losses, however, extracts a "social interest" criterion not
shared by all members of that society.131 Furthermore, such an ap-
proach presupposes a utilitarian ethic:
1 87
Whether traced to a principle that society simply should not
exploit individuals in order to achieve its goals, or to an idea that
such exploitation causes too much dissatisfaction from a strictly
utilitarian point of view unless it is brought under control, the
just compensation requirement appears to express a limit on gov-
ernment's power to isolate particular individuals for sacrifice to
the general good. 8
Finally, the balancing process experiences difficulty in determining
the relevant factors; in other words, "[h]ow can the 'individual
loss' be extracted from the calculation of the 'social gain' so as to
be 'weighed against' it? ' '18 e
The fourth paradigm distinguishes between private fault and
public benefit, or harm prevention and benefit extraction. This
harm prevention/benefit extraction model denotes that compensa-
tion is required if the restriction creates a public benefit at a pri-
vate owner's expense, while compensation need not be given if the
governmental restriction prevents nuisance-like behavior in order
to avoid harm to the public.1 40 Generally speaking, this approach
Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U.
FLA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1972). See notes 7, 21 supra.
135. Town of Bay Harbor Islands v. Schlapik, 57 So. 2d 855, 857 (Fla. 1952).
136. See Michelman, supra note 122, at 1194.
137. See id. at 1194-95.
138. L. TamE, supra note 56, § 9-4, at 463 (footnotes omitted).
139. Michelman, supra note 122, at 1194.
140. See Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 COLuM. L. Rcv.
650, 663-69 (1958). See generally Harris, supra note 45, at 664-69; Michelman, supra note
122, at 1196-201.
In his treatise on the police power, Freund tied the harm/benefit distinction into the dis-
tinction between eminent domain and police power:
[I]t may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is
useful to the public, and under the police power because it is harmful.... From
this results the difference between the power of eminent domain and the police
power, that the former recognizes a right to compensation, while the latter on
principle does not.
E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER § 511, at 546-47 (1904).
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encounters a difficulty with classification. A criterion of "neutral"
conduct must be enqwciated "which enables us to say where refusal
to confer benefits (riot reversible without compensation) slips over
into readiness to inflict harms (reversible without compensa-
tion)." 1" Justice Sutherland's aphorism exemplifies the problem:
"A nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place-like a
pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."'
What if, however, the parlor has come to the pig rather than the
pig going to the parlor? s4 3 This question of just who is the nuisance
characterizes the difficulty with the "nuisance" theory, a species of
the harm/benefit paradigm. As Mugler v. Kansas4 4 displayed, a
central feature of this theory is its fault underpinning; the offend-
ing party may be required to stop, or, if he refuses, his property
may be seized as a means of enforcing social stability.14 5 Central to
the nuisance theory, then, is the perception that "society is compe-
tent to override such inefficient private decisions by directing a
reallocation.'" 6
Recognition of the problem of classifying the object of the nui-
sance in contradistinction to the object of the fault has led to a
variant of the harm/benefit paradigm which would distinguish
between governmental enterprise and arbitral functions. 4 7 When
government acts in an enterprise or participant capacity and pri-
vate economic loss results, compensation is required. If, however,
government acts in its arbitral role in society, compensation need
141. Michelman, supra note 122, at 1197.
142. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
143. See L. TImE, supra note 56, § 9-3, at 462. For a similar illustration of the "nui-
sance" problem employing Miller v. Schoene, see Michelman, supra note 122, at 1198.
144. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). See notes 46-51 supra and accompanying text.
The Mugler Court stated:
The power which the states have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their
property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the pub-
lic, is not-and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society,
cannot be-burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such
individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not
being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the
community.
123 U.S. at 669.
145. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970) (nuisance-like activity
allowed to continue while paying damages to the affected landowners). See also L. Tmz,
supra note 56, § 9-3, at 461.
146. Michelman, supra note 122, at 1200.
147. The idea is to discriminate between governmental roles by classifying one role as a
public enterpriser and the other as an arbitrator of shifting values. See Sax, supra note 122,
at 62-63.
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not be paid.1"8 Professor Sax finds two assets to this approach: (i) a
physical invasion is not necessarily required to find the enhance-
ment of the government's resource position, and (ii) the dispositive
issue for compensation is the examination of the parties involved
and of government's role in that conflict, rather than whether gov-
ernmental behavior is a restriction upon use."" This approach,
however, turns on an illusory tagging of fault and begs the question
with respect to harm prevention and benefit extraction.1 50
The final paradigm focuses upon the range of reasonable expec-
tations by the private property owner, the disruption of which re-
quires compensation. 5 ' This analysis was demonstrated by the
Florida Supreme Court in Estuary: "Another factor which may be
considered in determining the reasonableness of an exercise of the
police power involves the investment-backed expectations of the
use of the property."" 2 On the basis of this factor, the court first
distinguished Zabel from Estuary factually: "In Zabel the property
in question had been transferred from the state to the landowners
by a conveyance which carried with it a statutory right to bulkhead
and fill the property purchased," whereas "[w]hen Estuary bought
the property in question in this case. . . it did so with no reason
to believe that the conveyance carried with it a guarantee from the
state that dredging and filling the property would be permitted." 53
Significantly, the court then compared the initial findings in Zabel
with those in the instant case: "In Zabel the court did not find that
any material, adverse effect on the public interest had been
demonstrated," whereas "[i]n the instant case there is no question
but that the proposed development would have an adverse envi-
148. See generally Harris, supra note 45, at 669-72; Michelman, supra note 122, at 1200.
149. See Sax, supra note 122, at 63.
150. Michelman offers the following.
In the case of the ban on highway advertising, for example, it would evidently be
enough to substantiate a claim for compensation that the regulation has the effect
of making more valuable the public's property.... But if the ordinance were one
calling for removal of billboards from areas in which the beneficiaries were all
private land owners, so that no significant benefit would accrue to the public at
large, no compensation would be required.
Michelman, supra note 122, at 1200 (footnote omitted).
151. Professor Tribe augments: "[T]he expectations protected by the [compensation]
clause must have their source outside the positive law of the state. Grounded in custom or
necessity, those expectations achieve protected status not because the state has designed to
accord them protection but because constitutional norms entitle them to protection." L.
Taw, supra note 56, § 9-5, at 465.
152. 399 So. 2d at 1383. See note 20 supra and accompanying text. See also Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175, 179 (1979).
153. 399 So. 2d at 1379 (footnote omitted).
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ronmental impact."'" A paradigm grounded in the language of ex-
pectations is circular, however, inasmuch as the expectations them-
selves are subject to governmental manipulation. 155
From these analytical paradigms developed by the United States
Supreme Court, the Florida Supreme Court in Estuary adopted
the paradigms of harm prevention/benefit extraction "' and bal-
ancing, 15 as well as a reasonable expectations analysis, in the con-
text of environmental regulation. Given the problems inherent in
these approaches, a lack of theoretical unity and predictability can
result.' " Furthermore, the court's reliance upon problematic
models fails to account for the ethical duties, rights, and obliga-
tions which provide the fundamental underpinnings of environ-
mental regulation:
As our scientific and technological understanding expands, we
find that activities once thought innocent may cause incalculable
harm. Where harm is shown, nuisance law-and, by analogy to
nuisance, the police power--can stay the activity, even if this
would leave property with little value. Yet not all harmful activity
is immediately toxic; generations unborn may suffer from activi-
ties that we fail to control today. The regulatory power can guard
the future, and indeed, we trust it to do so.159
Given the recognition by the United States Supreme Court that
states have a right to protect their natural resources,6  coupled
with the fact that "[m]aintenance of fragile lands . . . , particu-
larly wetlands and coastal estuarine areas, . . . is important for
preservation of ecological systems on which man ultimately de-
pends,"161 a judicial doctrine could have been announced in Estu-
ary which would have outlined the social responsibilities and costs.
Two doctrinal archetypes were possible. One is the "public trust"
doctrine, " which would involve the state holding designated prop-
154. Id. See generally Comment, supra note 8, at 513-14.
155. See Tribe, supra note 56, § 9-5, at 465.
156. 399 So. 2d at 1382. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
157. 399 So. 2d at 1377. See notes 33, 34 supra and accompanying text.
158. See generally Haigler, McInerny, Rhodes, supra note 45.
159. Berger, The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Pro-
fessor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. Rzv. 799, 823 (1976).
160. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908).
161. Developments in the Law-Zoning, 91 HARv. L. Rzv. 1427, 1593 (1978) (footnotes
omitted). See Sibson v. State, 336 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1975); Just v. Marinette County, 201
N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
162. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). See generally Sax, The Pub-
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erty in trust as a trustee for the benefit of the people. As a result,
the people can utilize the doctrine to ensure that the state protects
and maintains the property for the common good.16 s The doctrine
was utilized in Just v. Marinette County'" with respect to regula-
tion of lands adjacent to or near navigable waters:
This is not a case of an isolated swamp unrelated to a navigable
lake or stream, the change of which would cause no harm to pub-
lic rights. Lands adjacent to or near navigable waters exist in a
special relationship to the state. They ... are subject to the state
public trust powers.' 65
The other archetype would involve construing cases involving wet-
lands and coastal estuarine areas under the Florida Constitution.1"
"Taking" jurisprudence traditionally has centered around
whether to compensate a private landowner for governmental
action when that action "deprived" the "faultless" landowner of a
use of his property which was deemed to be "reasonable" or
"harmless." As exemplified in Estuary, the taking issue, within the
context of environmental regulation, generally revolves around
whether the public must compensate a coastal wetlands owner
whose desire to develop has been frustrated because of the external
destructiveness of his activities. The debate, however, should en-
compass a broader base which circumscribes ethical and social con-
cerns common to discussions in constitutional matters. In other
lic Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L.
Rav. 471 (1970); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes Submerged Tradi-
tional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970).
163. 1 V. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 11-15 (1972).
164. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
165. Id. at 769.
166. "It shall be the policy of the state to conserve and protect its natural resources and
scenic beauty. Adequate provision shall be made by law for the abatement of air and water
pollution and of excessive and unnecessary noise." FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7. See Seadade
Indus., Inc. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971).
One commentator has proposed the following revision to the Florida Constitution:
The people of the State, of both the present and future generations, have the right
to a healthful environment. As trustee for the people, the State shall protect the
environment and enforce the right of the people in it. Any citizen may enforce the
right on behalf of the State, or upon refusal of the State to enforce the right rec-
ognized in this provision, any citizen may bring an action against the State for
breach of trust. Any damages awarded in a suit for the enforcement of this right
shall be deposited in a trust fund held by the State expressly designated for cor-
rection of damage done to the environment of the State.
Note, A Proposal for Revision of the Florida Constitution: Environmental Rights for
Florida Citizens, 5 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 809, 825 (1977) (footnote omitted).
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words, "taking" must be perceived as a flexible constitutional con-
cept and not subject to sterile analytical paradigms based upon
necessary and sufficient conditions, since:
[m]aintenance of sufficient fresh water, fresh air, and productive
soil is more than a social desideratum; it is an imperative to the
continuation of human life .... Accordingly, it should occupy the
highest priority in promoting what, arguably, is the ultimate goal
of any legal system: "establishing, maintaining and perfecting the
conditions necessary for community life to perform its role in the
complete development of man."107
ANTHONY E. DIRESTA
167. Finnell, supra note 35, at 390 (footnotes omitted).
